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FOREWORD
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTURE POWER IN
REDUCING INJUSTICE AND UNWARRANTED
DISPARITY UNDER THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES*
Hon. John S. Martin, Jr.t
Fifteen years ago, the United States Sentencing
Commission ("Sentencing Commission" or "Commission")
submitted the first set of Sentencing Guidelines to Congress.
Although the Sentencing Guidelines became effective on
November 1, 1987, they were not implemented in most federal
courts until January, 1989,' when the Supreme Court upheld
their constitutionality in Mistretta v. United States.2
Since we now have complete data on the workings of the
guideline system for its first ten years, it is worthwhile to
review that information to see if the guideline system has
accomplished its intended purposes and to ask whether
changes should be made.' The available data demonstrates
02000 John S. Martin, Jr. All Rights Reserved.
t United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Melinda (a/k/a/ Mindy) Eades, an
extremely able law student who served as a student intern in my chambers and
who suggested this Foreword.
' Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in
Perspective: A Theoretical Background and Overview, in THE U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIIflNAL JUSTICE 3, 15-16 (1989).
2 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
' For an excellent exposition of the background of the Sentencing Reform Act
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that there is wide disparity in how the Sentencing Guidelines
are applied in each of the twelve circuits.4 The Second Circuit
is a leader in recognizing that the adoption of the Sentencing
Guidelines was not intended to strip district court judges of the
power to do justice in individual cases and that the exercise of
the departure power is important to the proper functioning of
the guideline system.' This Foreword contends that rigid
adherence to guideline sentences has not and cannot end true
disparity in sentencing and that the Second Circuit's
recognition of the departure power's role in a just sentencing
system properly balances the need to end unwarranted
disparity while maintaining proportionality in sentencing and
doing justice in individual cases.
At the outset, it should be noted that the original
Sentencing Commission accomplished a task that many
thought could not be done; it developed a workable set of
guidelines that could be applied with relative ease to the wide
variety of criminal conduct prohibited by federal law. Thus,
anything said hereinafter to suggest that other approaches
might have been desirable or that changes should be made is
not meant to denigrate the significance of the original
Sentencing Commission's accomplishments.
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act,6 district court judges
had practically unlimited discretion in imposing sentences. If
the sentence was within the sentencing range established by
the relevant statute, the appellate courts would not review the
propriety of the sentence Given the breadth of this
unreviewable power in imposing sentences, it is not surprising
that there were instances in which substantially different
sentences were imposed by different judges in what appeared
to be identical circumstances.
and an analysis of many of the issues raised by guideline sentencing, see
generally KATE STTH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
4 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 SOURCEBOOK].
See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1306 (2d Cir. 1993).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (2000).
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974).
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Perhaps the seminal work leading to the Sentencing
Reform Act was CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WrTHouT ORDER,8
published in 1973 and authored by then United States District
Judge Marvin E. Frankel. Judge Frankel detailed instances of
unfairness and disparity in sentencing that resulted from the
exercise of unguided and unreviewable discretion in imposing
sentences.' Among the alternative solutions he suggested was
a sentencing commission."°
No one familiar with the history of the Sentencing Reform
Act would disagree with the Sentencing Commission's
conclusion that, in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act,
"Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar
criminal offenses committed by similar offenders."" Since
ending unwarranted disparity in sentencing was a principal
reason for establishing the guideline system, the first question
to be asked is whether experience has shown that this goal has
been accomplished. A look at the most recent statistics from
the Commission's 1999 Annual Report suggests that the
answer to that question is a resounding "no."
In fiscal year 1999, only 64.9% of all sentences imposed
were within the prescribed guideline range. 2 In 18.7% of the
cases, downward departures from the guideline range were
made as a result of a motion by the prosecutor under Section
5K1.1 because of the defendant's substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person." In 15.8% of
the cases, judges departed below the guideline range under
Section 5K2.0,' 4 finding that " 'there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance.., not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.' ""
8 MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
9 Id. at 3-11.
'0 Id. at 118.
" UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMIISSION, UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter 1998 MANUAL].
12 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 53.
13 Id.
14 Id.
1" 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(2000)).
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Departures from the Sentencing Guidelines in 35.1% of the
cases does not, in itself, suggest that these departures give rise
to disparity. Indeed, in many of these instances, prosecutors
and judges are correctly identifying cases where departure is
appropriate under the standards established by Congress and
the Commission. However, even if we assume that the
Sentencing Guidelines were consistently applied in those cases
in which the courts departed under Sections 5K1.1 and 5K2.0,
the same risk of disparity that existed under the pre-guideline
regime exists today because those two provisions give judges as
much discretion in imposing sentences as they had before the
Sentencing Guidelines.
More importantly, however, the available data suggests
that there is a wide disparity in the exercise of the departure
power under Sections 5K1.1 and 5K2.0. Looking at the
extremes in substantial assistance departures: In the Western
District of North Carolina, 52.3% of the defendants received
substantial assistance departures, 6 while in the District of
South Dakota, only 5.3% of the defendants received such a
departure. 7 Making the same comparison by circuit reveals
that in the Third Circuit, 32.2% of all defendants received
substantial assistance departures, 8 while in the Ninth
Circuit, only 10.4% of the defendants received such
departures. 9 There is no reason to believe that the nature of
the crimes prosecuted in various parts of the country is so
different that the need for cooperating defendants would vary
substantially. Thus, these statistics suggest that there is great
disparity in the criteria used by individual United States
Attorneys in moving for Section 5K1.1 departures.
Similarly, there is disparity in the way individual judges
grant downward departures in cases where there is no motion
by the prosecutor for a substantial assistance departure. For
example, in the Eastern District of Arkansas, only 2.3% of all
defendants received downward departures for reasons other
than substantial assistance," whereas in the District of
Massachusetts, 22.6% of the defendants received such
16 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 53.
17 Id. at 54.
'8 Id. at 53.
'9 Id. at 55.
20 Id. at 54.
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departures. 21 A similar comparison by circuit shows that in
the Ninth Circuit, 36.4% of all defendants received such
departures,22 while in the Fourth Circuit, the departure rate
was 4.6%.'
Disparity in the application of the departure power by
prosecutors and judges is relatively easy to detect. What is not
as easy to detect, however, is the extent of the disparity that
no doubt exists even in the 64.9% of the 1999 cases in which
the defendants were sentenced within the guideline range.
Before examining the factors that may lead to disparity among
sentences imposed within the guideline range, it is important
to note that disparity in sentences can occur in one of two
ways. First, individuals who commit similar crimes in similar
circumstances may receive different sentences. Second,
individuals who commit different crimes in different
circumstances may receive the same sentence even though the
conduct of one is more culpable than that of the other. In
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress intended to end
such disparities.24 Unfortunately, experience suggests that the
emphasis on ending the first type of disparity has resulted in
an increase in the second type of disparity.
There are a variety of factors that result in disparities in
sentences imposed within the Sentencing Guidelines that are
not as easy to measure as those found with respect to 5K1.1
and 5K2.0 departures. First, the Sentencing Guidelines do not
impose any meaningful limits on the prosecutors' discretion in
selecting the crimes with which the defendants will be
charged.' Anyone who has been active in the criminal justice
system since the inception of the Sentencing Guidelines knows
21 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 53. The rate of such departures is even
greater in some border districts where the volume of immigration cases presents
special problems. For example, in the District of Arizona, there are downward
departures for reasons other than substantial assistance in 57.9% of all criminal
cases. Id. at 55.
22 Id. at 55.
' Id. at 53.
24 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 3.
25 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 130. For an in-depth analysis of
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining practices, see generally Ilene H. Nagel
& Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study on Charging
and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 501 (1992).
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that there are instances when the prosecutor will file a less
serious charge to induce a defendant to plead guilty and
thereby avoid being sentenced under a more severe guideline.
Second, in negotiating a plea, prosecutors may agree to
forego a sentencing enhancement that they would seek after a
trial, such as an increase for the defendant's role in the
offense, or agree to limit the scope of the defendant's criminal
conduct, which is used to calculate his guideline range, to less
than that which might be proved at trial.26 These decisions to
seek less in a plea than might be obtained after trial may be
totally appropriate given the risks inherent in litigation, but
there is no reason to believe that all prosecutors are applying
uniform standards in making these choices. While the
Sentencing Guidelines do provide that, before accepting a plea,
the judge must be satisfied "either that (1) the agreed sentence
is within the applicable guideline range; or (2) the agreed
sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for
justifiable reasons,"27 district court judges and probation
officers often lack sufficient information to challenge the
parties' stipulation as to the applicable facts. Indeed, a district
judge who believes that the guideline sentence is too harsh is
unlikely to look for ways to increase the defendant's sentence.
Third, even where judges and prosecutors are attempting
to apply the Sentencing Guidelines in total good faith, some of
the factors that may enhance or decrease an offense level lack
sufficient precision to insure completely uniform application.
For example, the Sentencing Guidelines provide for decreases
in the offense level if the defendant was a "minimal" or
"minor" participant in the crime.28 Similarly, both the bribery
and fraud guidelines provide for a sentence enhancement if the
criminal conduct "substantially jeopardized the safety and
soundness of a financial institution."29
The most significant factor that can give rise to disparity
in applying the Sentencing Guidelines is the differences in the
available proof of criminal activity. Does the prosecutor have
merely a snapshot of the defendant's criminal activity or is her
26 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at § 6B1.2(a).
27 Id. at § 6B1.2(c).
28 Id. at § 3B1.2.
29 Id. at §§ 2B4.1(b)(2)(A), 2FL.(b)(6).
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proof more like a videotape of a year in the defendant's
criminal life? The answer to that question will result in
substantially different sentences.
For example, let us assume that two brothers with
identical backgrounds and criminal histories are selling crack
on two different street corners and that they have been doing
so for three months. Both are arrested after making sales of
one gram of crack each to an undercover agent. After his
arrest, one brother tells the agent that he has been making
about thirty such sales at that location six days a week for the
last three months. His brother, however, exercises his
constitutional right to remain silent, and he answers no
questions. If both plead guilty and do not cooperate with the
prosecution, the first brother will face a guideline range of 168-
210 months because the criminal conduct that he admitted
when he was arrested will be considered in calculating his
guideline range."a However, his equally culpable brother will
face only 18-24 months.3 The same disparity in sentencing
would result if the police have been surveilling the first
brother's corner for three months as part of an investigation of
those higher up in the distribution chain, but there had been
no similar surveillance of the second brother.
While the preceding example is extreme, the problem is
common. Every day, judges read presentence reports of people
involved in criminal activity who have prior criminal records
and no legitimate means of supporting themselves. The
defendant may have been charged with a single offense
resulting from a single transaction, but there is no reason to
doubt that the defendant has been engaged in that same
criminal conduct on a regular basis. For example, no judge or
prosecutor sentencing the second brother would doubt that he
had made numerous sales of similar quantities prior to his
O This brother's base offense level is 38. Id. at §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), 2D1.1 (c)(1). He
then receives a three point downward departure for acceptance of responsibility.
1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at § 3El.1. The sentence for an offense level 35 is
168-210 months. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
" The base offense level for this range is 18. Id. at §§ 2DL.(a)(3), 2D1.1
(c)(11). After the same three point departure for acceptance of responsibility, this
brother has an offense level of 15. Id. at § 3E1.1. Therefore, his sentence is 18-24
months. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
arrest. Yet because he, unlike the first brother, did not confess
to such prior drug sales, his sentence would be fixed only by
the amount sold to the undercover agent.
One of the problems that guideline sentencing was
designed to cure was the sense of injustice that an incarcerated
defendant would feel when he finds himself sharing a jail cell
with someone who engaged in the exact same conduct but who
received a substantially different sentence.3 In the example
above, if we assume that the two drug sellers were not related
and did not meet until they found themselves sharing a jail
cell, there is no question that the first would feel that he was
treated very unjustly, particularly because his enhanced
sentence resulted from his willingness to cooperate with the
agents after his arrest.34
Disparity in sentencing resulting from differences in proof
is far from unusual. In addition to differences that result from
post-arrest statements or the length of the investigation, there
are a wide variety of situations where differences in the
availability of proof result in disparate sentences. A good
example is United States v. Chau,35 which arose from a
3 131 CONG. REC. S 4083 (1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 1998 MANUAL,
supra note 11, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 3.
"' Furthermore, even if these two were co-defendants in the same criminal
action, the judge would most likely not be able to depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines in light of this disparity. Disparity among co-defendants is not
permissible grounds for departure under Section 5K2.0 in the circuits that have
considered the issue. See, e.g., United States v. McMutuary, 217 F.3d 477, 490
(7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 951 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Polanco, 53 F.3d 893, 897-98 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Ives, 984 F.2d 649, 650 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061,
1066 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1282 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1428 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Williams, 980 F.2d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d
454, 459-61 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Meija, 953 F.2d 461, 467-68 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448 (1st Cir. 1991). The reason
these courts have so held is generally claimed to be because the Sentencing
Guidelines were drafted to end disparity nationwide, in the abstract, and so, "the
greater uniformity trumps the lesser disparity." Meija, 953 F.2d at 468. As we
have seen, the available data indicates that this "greater uniformity" may be
illusory. In light of the fact that ending disparity in sentencing was the main
purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, it is ironic now that those same Guidelines
preclude judges confronted with concrete examples of exactly that disparity from
using their discretion towards the same end.
No. 95 Cr. 15, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1996).
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lengthy investigation of fraud in connection with the food
stamp program. Many people who qualify for food stamps
would prefer to have cash. However, they cannot sell food
stamps for cash or use them to purchase food in a restaurant;
they may only use them to purchase food in a grocery store or
supermarket. In Chau, the owner of a Chinese restaurant
purchased food stamps for cash, giving the seller 50-60% of the
face value of the stamps. Since restaurant owners could not
deposit food stamps in the bank, they passed them along a
chain of suppliers and wholesalers, each receiving a greater
percentage of the face value than he had paid. Ultimately,
those higher up on the chain persuaded others, generally
poorer members of the Chinese communi , to open sham
grocery stores and obtain the necessary license to deal in food
stamps. While these food store owners may have purchased
and deposited $1 million of food stamps to their accounts, their
gross profit was only $30,000 because they had paid $.97 on
the dollar for the stamps.36 Since the store owners' sentencing
guideline was based on the amount of the fraud, not their
profit, these members of the illegal chain received sentences of
18-24 months. In contrast, the proof against the restaurant
owner, who had no doubt been purchasing food stamps several
times a day for a substantial period of time, was his purchase
of $1,600 in food stamps from an undercover agent on four
occasions. Thus, his guideline range was only 0-6 months.38
No one with a sense of proportionality in sentencing could
conclude that there was a rational reason for the difference in
the sentencing of the store owner and the restaurant owner.
Differences in available proof will impact the sentencing
process regardless of whether there are sentencing
guidelines.39 However, the difficulties discussed above have a
much more dramatic impact in a guideline system in which
courts are required to make highly specific factual findings
that can have a dramatic impact on the sentence imposed. In
the above example of the two drug selling brothers, an
experienced judge in the pre-guideline era, familiar with the
Id. at 6 n.3.
3, Id. at 2.
' Id. at 3.
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 131.
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vagaries of proof, would no doubt impose sentences on the
brothers that were much closer in length than those required
by the Sentencing Guidelines.
Another factor that leads to a lack of proportionality in
sentencing is the breadth of criminal conduct that may be
encompassed within a single guideline. A good example of this
problem is found in the fraud guideline. In each of the
following fraud cases, a defendant who pleads guilty will face a
guideline sentence of 21-27 months4": (1) the defendant, in an
attempt to save his failing company that employs twenty-five
people, obtains a $1 million loan from his supplier, a Fortune
500 company, using false financial statements;41 (2) the
defendant provides inside information to twenty friends, each
of whom makes $50,000 by trading in the subject stock;42 (3)
the defendant contracts with a third world country, whose
people are starving, to sell $1 million of powdered milk, but
actually ships animal feed;43 (4) the defendant fraudulently
induces each of ten retired couples to turn over to him their
life's savings of $100,000. 44 Moreover, the guideline range for
each of them would be six months less than that for a
defendant who obtains $20 from each of 50,000 men through
ads falsely stating that his product will cure baldness.45 It is
doubtful that anyone would reasonably suggest that these
sentences reflect the different levels of culpability among the
defendants.
The above examples represent some, but not all, of the
ways in which guideline sentencing can result in disparities.
Since under the pre-guideline regime there was no meaningful
way to measure the extent of disparity in sentencing, it is not
possible to determine whether there is more or less disparity
under the present system. Nevertheless, there is very little
likelihood that Congress will repeal the Sentencing Reform
Act. Therefore, the important question is not whether there
was more or less disparity in the pre-guideline era but whether
we can do anything to improve the present system so that the
40 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at §§ 2F1.I(b)(1)(S), 2F1.I(b)(2)(A), 3El.1.
41 Id.
42 Id. at § 2F1.2(b)(1).
- Id. at §§ 2F1.I(b)(1)(S), 2F1.1(b)(2)(A), 3E1.1.
44 Id.
" 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at § 2FL.I(b)(3).
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effort to avoid disparity does not result in the imposition of
sentences that are disproportionate to the culpability of the
defendant.
First, and most importantly, Congress and the appellate
courts must recognize that we cannot achieve perfection in any
system devised and applied by fallible human beings. If the
system is going to err, let it be on the side of doing justice in
the individual case, rather than imposing uniform sentences
that treat many defendants unfairly. It is of little consolation
to the family of a defendant who is serving a lengthy sentence
that is too severe to know that another defendant has been
treated equally unfairly.
Second, it is important to remember that ours is a common
law tradition. Justice Holmes observed, "It is the merit of the
common law that it decides the case first and determines the
principle afterwards."" This tradition of having our rules of
law evolve out of the decision of individual disputes has served
us well over hundreds of years. It is a mistake to abandon our
tradition of first seeking a just result in the individual case in
favor of a strict guideline system that attempts to determine in
advance what the appropriate result is in a hypothetical case
and then requires that result in every case that falls within
the same general category.
This is not to say, however, that we must abandon the
Sentencing Guidelines system. To the extent that the
Sentencing Guidelines provide district court judges with a
benchmark for the appropriate sentence in certain cases, they
represent a vast improvement over the prior regime, in which
the district court judges had absolutely no guidance in
determining where, within the statutory range, sentences
should be imposed. A guideline system that provides
reasonable flexibility to the sentencing judge should result in
less disparity than a system without guidelines. Having some
benchmark is better than having over 650 district court judges
deciding for themselves what the appropriate sentence is for a
particular violation of federal law. For example, there should
be a general understanding as to the appropriate sentence for
" G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOimES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 124 (1993).
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a defendant without a criminal record who sells a kilogram of
heroin; there should not be 650 different answers.
The basic problem with the present Sentencing Guidelines
system is that most of the circuit courts have placed overly
strict limits on the power of district court judges to depart
from the guideline range in appropriate circumstances.
Fortunately, this is not true in the Second Circuit, which has
one of the highest departure rates in the country and the
lowest reversal rates when district court judges do depart.47
In large part, the restrictions on the departure power in
other circuits result from the fact that all guideline manuals
state that "the Commission believes that despite the courts'
legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so
very often."4" However, this prediction is true only because it
has been a self-fulfilling prophesy. Circuit courts have seized
upon this and similar language in the UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL to reverse district court
judges who have exercised the departure power, thereby
chilling the exercise of that power.49
"7 The data available shows that there is no case involving a downward
departure that was reversed outright. There are, however, some sentencing appeals
that were affirmed in part and reversed in part, but one cannot easily determine
whether the partial reversals resulted from a departure or a refusal to depart.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2000 NATIONAL SENTENCING POLICY INSTITUTE 35
(2000). By comparison, the Fourth Circuit reversed 10.1% of the downward
departures granted in the district courts in fiscal year 1999. Id.
" E.g., 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at ch. 1, pt. 4(b).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 215 F.3d 1068, 1078 (10th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Sentamu, 212 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401,
436 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir.
1999); United States v. DeBeir, 186 F.3d 561, 567-68 (4th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Stevens,
197 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Winters, 174 F.3d 478, 485
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Miller, 78 F.3d 507, 511 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Olbres, 99 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d
754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Godfrey, 22 F.3d 1048, 1053 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Williams, 37 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1994). Similarly, circuit
courts have seized on the same language and variants to affirm district court
judges' assertions that they have no authority to depart. See, e.g., United States v.
Caron, 208 F.3d 321, 323 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that there is no magic to
particular terms like "most rare," "exceptional," and "highly infrequent"); United
States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Corry,
206 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2000).
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The experience in the Second Circuit, where district court
judges have been given a substantial degree of freedom to
depart from guideline sentences, suggests that the Sentencing
Commission's prediction that judges would not find it
appropriate to depart "very often" was wrong. In 1999, district
court judges within the Second Circuit departed below the
applicable guideline range in 25% of the cases that required a
guideline sentence.0 In order to depart, they had to find that
the case before them was not within the "heartland" of cases to
which the guideline was intended to apply.5 The fact that
these judges found that 25% of their cases were outside the
"heartland" covered by the Sentencing Guidelines, and that,
therefore, a lower sentence was necessary to do justice in the
cases before them, strongly suggests that similar findings
would be made by district court judges throughout the country
if they felt that they had the power to do so. Thus, the
Commission's prediction that judges would not "very often"
find a need to depart should no longer be accepted as a guiding
rule.52
Indeed, the current Sentencing Commission has
apparently recognized that experience has shown the need for
an expanded use of the departure power. The most recent
Annual Report of the Sentencing Commission (the current
Commission's first such report) states:
Under section 5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure), the Commission
granted broad departure authority to district courts by adopting the
language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which provides that a court is
permitted to depart from a guideline sentence only when it finds "an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
In 1999, there were 4,119 sentences imposed. Out of that many, there were
953 substantial assistance departures. In the remaining 3,166 cases there were
downward departures in 802. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2000 NATIONAL
SENTENCING POLICY INSTITUTE 35 (2000).
51 The 1995 GUIDELINES state:
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as
carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct
that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct
significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a
departure is warranted.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (Nov. 1995).
5' 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 53.
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adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described." The discretionary power of district
courts was broadened by the 1996 decision in Koon v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996)."
The Commission could take a substantial step to foster a
greater use of the departure power by incorporating these
sentiments into the official commentary to the Sentencing
Guidelines. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, the only author-
itative pronouncements of the Sentencing Commission that
may be considered in imposing sentences are "the Sentencing
Guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission."54 Thus, until the Sentencing Com-
mission puts its views on the breadth of the departure power
into the official commentary, it is likely that circuit courts will
continue to use the official commentary's statement that "de-
spite the ... legal freedom to depart ... [district judges] will
not do so very often"55 as a basis for limiting the departure
power of district court judges.
In Koon v. United States,56 Justice Kennedy eloquently
expressed the importance of departures in our guideline sen-
tencing system:
The goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjus-
tified disparities and so reach toward the evenhandedness and neu-
trality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of
justice. In this respect, the Guidelines provide uniformity, predict-
ability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system.
This, too, must be remembered, however. It has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to
consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a
unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, some-
times magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue. We do not
understand it to have been the congressional purpose to withdraw
all sentencing discretion from the United States district judge.5
If federal judges throughout the country recognize that the
"exercise of the departure power, in appropriate circumstances,
3 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 25-26 (1999).
-4 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (2000).
" 1998 MANUAL, supra note 11, at ch. 1, pt. 4(b); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 48.
" 518 U.S. 113 (1996).
" Id. at 113.
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is an essential ingredient of the sentencing system[,]"8 we
will be well on our way to developing a more just and rational
sentencing system. There will still be instances in which the
sentencing judges disagree with the sentencing range selected
by the Commission for the prototypical case. That is the price
we should and must pay to end unwarranted disparity. Howev-
er, having the power to depart in appropriate circumstances
should eliminate instances in which judges find themselves
imposing sentences which they consider totally unjust.
5 United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1306 (2d Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The legislative history re-
flects that it was not Congress' aim to straightjacket a sentencing court, compel-
ling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines' glass bubble, and
preventing it from exercising discretion, flexibility or independent judgment.");
United States v. Livoti, 196 F.3d 322, 328-30 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d
648, 663 (2d Cir. 1996).

